LegalResearchFoundation

In Attorney-General v Taylor, the Supreme Court expressly declined to comment on the wider constitutional expectations generated by a declaration of inconsistency. This article attempts to decode the constitutional impact of the decision. It argues that despite the conservative methodology of the Supreme Court's decision, it nevertheless has radical potential as a strong affirmation of the Court's role as an arbiter of rights, and for the future development of new remedies. The article concludes by arguing that the Supreme Court's decision has significant limitations, but that it could be effective as a complement to proposed legislative reforms of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 in fostering interbranch dialogue and human rights protection.

Over 40 years ago the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee resolved to reform the law of contractual mistakes. The Committee determined that it was sensible not to limit the reforms to cover only mistake as to basic assumptions but chose instead to include a misunderstanding as to terms in the reforms. In part the Committee was driven to do so by a desire to locate the law on contractual mistakes in one comprehensive statute. The principal architect of the reforms subsequently accepted that the Committee's primary emphasis was on the reform of the law relating to mistakes as to basic assumptions. Therefore, the extent of the proposed changes to the law of formation of contract brought about by the new legislation was never fully considered. As a result there are a number of issues relating to the law on misunderstanding of terms which remain of considerable difficulty. These include the true interpretation: of s 22(1) of the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 (can one invoke a defence that there is no contract at common law because of a misunderstanding as to terms?); of s 24 (1)(a)(iii) (when are cross purposes mistakes caught?); and of s 25(2) (when is there a mistake in the interpretation of a contract?). This article reviews the principal difficulties which confronted the Committee in reforming the law of mistake and critically examines the decision to include misunderstandings as to terms in the legislation.

Under current New Zealand law, no consequences attach to mothers who birth children presenting with Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, nor are there any established mechanisms for preventing the harm. This article evaluates the rationale for non-interference and suggests that these should not bar all forms of legal intervention. It considers the potential avenues for reform in criminal law, tort law, and the courts' guardianship jurisdiction, concluding that intervention would best manifest in the guardianship jurisdiction.