The New Zealand judiciary is increasingly willing to give literal effect to legislative provisions that seek to limit or exclude judicial review. Analysis of case law spanning the last century suggests that this not a product of a shift in judicial attitude but instead a reflection of the fact that modern privative provisions say different things, and speak in a very different context, to their historical counterparts. The administrative reforms effected from the late 1960s and the proliferation of statutory appeal routes by which administrative decisions can be challenged have lessened the role that review must play, at least in some contexts. As a result, there has been a move away from reliance on the concept of jurisdiction and nullity-based reasoning, and a corresponding willingness to interpret literally those provisions that limit review and provide for other oversight of administrative decision-making. In some contexts, however, privative provisions threaten more strongly the rule of law values by which the judiciary is oriented. The same is true when an alleged error is particularly egregious. In such instances, and in contrast to the mainstream approach, judges resort to jurisdictional or nullity-based reasoning. The judicial approach to privative provisions is thus inconsistent and, to the extent that nullity-based reasoning is used, at odds with contemporary theories of decision-making. The conclusion drawn is that a new, more conceptually coherent, justification for the judicial approach to privative provisions needs to be posited.