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In 2018, the Government published its mental health inquiry. It recommended that New Zealand repeal the Mental Health Act 1992 and replace it with a more human rights-oriented approach by minimising compulsory treatment and emphasising informed consent. The inquiry failed to address the human rights of a significant percentage of compulsory psychiatric patients — those who are subject to detention and compulsory treatment because they were acquitted of serious crimes by reason of insanity. These "special patients" do not need to be "mentally disordered" in order to be subject to detention and compulsory treatment, and they are not entitled to release if they are no longer mentally disordered. Instead, the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 authorises committal when an insanity acquittee is dangerous regardless of whether there is a contemporaneous mental disorder. The indefinite detention of these individuals, solely because of a determination of dangerousness, constitutes arbitrary preventive detention.

The OECD has for several years been laboriously attempting to reform the international tax system so as to rectify the gross undertaxation of heavily digitalised firms such as Google, Facebook and eBay. Progress has been slow, though, so a number of countries, including New Zealand, have announced plans to address the problem by unilaterally introducing a Digital Services Tax or DST. This article assesses the OECD's work to date and also New Zealand's proposed DST. It concludes that the OECD's proposals, if implemented at all, are likely to lead to broader reforms of the international tax system; and that if a DST is introduced in New Zealand, it should be provided for by amendments to the GST Act, rather than the Income Tax Act.

The courts in New Zealand are clear that equitable estoppel is one unified doctrine "based on the concept of unconscionability". This unified doctrine has replaced the traditional types of equitable estoppel, such as promissory and proprietary estoppel, as well as estoppel by convention and probably even common law estoppel. This article will chart the rise of a unified estoppel in New Zealand and then critically examine some of its features that might cause us to question the utility of a broad-based doctrine. What is the meaning and role of detrimental reliance by the defendant? What does the notion of unconscionability mean and can the term sensibly provide the underlying basis for estoppel? What are the remedies that a successful estoppel claim is meant to achieve? Finally, the article will provide some suggestions for the future application of the unified doctrine of estoppel by the New Zealand courts.

The law of contempt of court is a vital part of the administration of justice. It provides the sanctions which enable courts to prevent the disruption of their business, interference with fair trials, noncompliance with court orders and the making of false and egregious statements which undermine public confidence in the judiciary. In doing so the law of contempt upholds the rule of law. The substantial codification of the law of contempt by the Contempt of Court Act 2019, which came into force on 26 August 2020, is therefore of considerable importance. This article explains the purposes and scheme of the Act, summarises its principal provisions, describes the genesis of the Act, its law reform history, focuses on two particular aspects of the Act as it relates to juries and judges, and considers the scope of the High Court's residual inherent jurisdiction. The article aims to assist those responsible for implementing, interpreting and applying the Act in the future.

Much has happened in the New Zealand conflict of laws since the last review published by this journal in 2013. The main focus of that review, written by Elsabe Schoeman, was the reform of the rules for service outside of the jurisdiction in the High Court Rules. The reform had clarified — and improved on — the grounds for the assumption of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants. In addition, the review noted the impending changes to the resolution of civil proceedings with a trans-Tasman element, brought about by the coming into force of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 in October 2013. In this review, I wish to pick up where Professor Schoeman left off, by providing an overview of the most significant developments in the New Zealand conflict of laws since 2013. There have been many cases on the rules of personal jurisdiction under the High Court Rules, some case law under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, a number of interesting decisions on jurisdictional tools like forum (non) conveniens and the power to grant anti-suit injunctions, and a steady flow of cases dealing with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. But the most significant developments arguably occurred in other areas of the conflict of laws: international civil procedure, principles of choice of law and the subject areas of property (and equity), obligations, and family. The aim of the present review is to provide a succinct overview of these developments. For more in-depth coverage — and for up-to-date commentary on the conflict of laws more generally — the reader is advised to consult a newly published text on the subject, The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand.